In 1066, England was invaded by a number of overseas powers. A northern pressure led by King Harald Hardrada of Norway superior on York through the River Humber, whereas a southern pressure, led by Duke William of Normandy (later William I the Conqueror) crossed the Channel with forces from Normandy, France, Brittany and Ponthieu, and took up place at Hastings.
King Harold of England needed to sprint up from London to take care of the vikings, solely to rush again south once more to take care of William. A distance of greater than 250 miles separated his victory at Stamford Bridge (on September 25) from Battle, the positioning of his defeat (on October 14) on the Battle of Hastings.
His “virtually miraculous” march, as one historian described it, grew to become a part of Harold’s legend. It’s now taught in colleges, recreated by re-enactors and depicted in TV dramas such because the latest BBC miniseries, King and Conqueror (2025).
For some, Harold’s compelled march was an unbelievable feat of generalship. For others, it was a deadly mistake. The conquest historian Allen Brown criticised Harold’s “reckless and impulsive haste”, whereas Henry Loyn accused Harold of “rashness” in enterprise a mad sprint south that exhausted his males and led to his defeat at Hastings.
Researching my new biography, Harold, Warrior King, I turned to the Latin and Outdated English sources. And what I discovered stunned me.
Tom Licence, CC BY-SA
Going again to the start, the forces Harold had assembled that spring to counter the specter of Norman invasion have been a land military and a fleet stationed on the south coast. They remained there till September 8, by which era William’s fleet had nonetheless not appeared. The land military was then despatched house, and the fleet sailed to London.
In line with the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, our most dependable up to date account, after the fleet returned, Harold realized that Harald Hardrada was invading the north.
In 1801, the historian Sharon Turner took the Chronicle’s phrase “after the fleet got here house” to point that the ships had all returned to their numerous ports. The daddy-figure of 1066 research Edward Augustus Freeman agreed, and subsequent historians fell in with believing that Harold had no fleet when information of the vikings got here.
A reference to a fleet (lið) which Harold then arrayed on the River Wharfe, south of York, when advancing on the vikings, was taken to check with some unexpectedly gathered pressure.
Assertions in two early Latin accounts of the battle that Harold had despatched a fleet towards William at Hastings seem to have confused many historians, who had come to consider that Harold had disbanded the fleet.
It was this obvious lack of a fleet that led Freeman to surmise Harold had marched up and down the nation. However Freeman was not the primary to recommend this; John Milton had written of the king marching to London “in nice haste” in his ebook Historical past of England in 1670.
The factor students seem to not have recognised is that the place the chronicle speaks of the fleet “coming house”, it means coming house to London. In its entry for the 12 months 1052, the identical chronicle refers back to the fleet journeying “homeward to London” on this approach.
Thus, the assertion that has lengthy misled students into considering Harold’s fleet was disbanded truly signifies he retained all of it alongside.
A centuries-old error
As soon as I had noticed what seems to be a 200-year-old error, I used to be capable of be part of the dots. The presence of a fleet on the River Wharfe now made sense, for this was the identical fleet which Harold had despatched up from London, having used it, we might assume, to move troops.
And people early references to Harold sending lots of of ships towards William’s camp at Hastings point out that he despatched the ships again right down to London subsequently, after the battle of Stamford Bridge.
Moreover, the king might have enlarged his fleet with captured viking vessels, because the chronicle states that 300 viking ships sailed into the Humber, however solely 24 returned to Norway.
What, then, of the march? Once I appeared into the Latin and Outdated English texts, I used to be unable to search out any reference to it. There are references to Harold hurrying south in a short time and to Harold “shifting” his military south, however the march is lacking.
Some students have been so wedded to the concept of a compelled march, nevertheless, that the translators of the Norman account Deeds of Duke William (circa 1071) translated the Latin phrase “returning speedily to assault you” (festinus redit in te) as “advancing towards you by compelled marches”.
Freeman referred to as the march “virtually miraculous”. And such a march could be. Crusing, nevertheless, would have taken just a few days and allowed the English military an opportunity to relaxation. Because the sources observe the actions of the fleet however nowhere point out a march, it could seem that Harold used ships for all his operations.
If Harold used ships, in fact, he can’t be accused of “reckless and impulsive haste”, and the reason for his defeat on the Battle of Hastings should be sought elsewhere.
Now not that determined, land-locked defender as historically depicted, assaulted on all sides from the ocean, this analysis reveals that Harold was a seaborne commander equal to his overseas foes – and no much less refined in combining warfare on sea and land in England’s defence.
This text options references to books which were included for editorial causes, and should comprise hyperlinks to bookshop.org. In case you click on on one of many hyperlinks and go on to purchase one thing from bookshop.org The Dialog UK might earn a fee.
